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Power Flows: 
Hydro-hegemony and  
Water Conflicts in South Asia 
Paula Hanasz 
Water is a point of friction on the Indian subcontinent and fears of looming ‘water wars’ are 
growing.  One factor compounding such fears is the presence of a hydro-hegemon; India.  
Power asymmetry between riparians, however, does not necessarily lead to violent conflict 
(even though it can create inequitable outcomes).  Indeed, the presence of a hydro-hegemon 
serves as a stabilising factor.  This is currently the case in South Asia.  Understanding the flows 
of power in transboundary water interactions in the region is of consequence to Australia’s 
increasing involvement in the hydropolitics there. 
Water is a point of friction on the Indian subcontinent, which is home to more 
than 21 per cent of the world's population yet must make do with barely 8.3 
per cent of global water resources.1  Now burgeoning populations—a result 
of rapid development of the region—are increasing demand for water at an 
unsustainable rate.  Climatic changes affecting glacial melt in the Himalayas 
exacerbate the problem of water availability.2  Scarcity in itself, however, is 
not the only trigger of water conflict here; major controversies also exist in 
the region as to the location and construction of dams.3  Moreover, mutual 
suspicions and reluctance to cooperate between riparians may impair timely 
approaches to the collective action problems of non-traditional security 
threats such as water conflict.4  Indeed, fears are rising about the possibility 
of ‘water wars’. 
Proponents of the water wars thesis are vociferous, and too often simplistic 
in their understanding of what constitutes and contributes to water disputes.  
Popular commentary and influential books such as Brahma Chellaney’s 
Water: Asia’s Next Battleground5 perpetuate the fear that state-versus-state 
zero-sum games are the new norm for hydropolitics.  This unsophisticated 
view skews assessments of regional security and stability.  The reality of 
                                                 
1 Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington D.C., Georgetown University 
Press, 2011), p. 277. 
2 Michael Renner, ‘Water Challenges in Central-South Asia’, Noref Policy Brief No 4 (Oslo: The 
Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, December 2009), p. 8. 
3 Douglas Hill, ‘Boundaries, Scale and Power in South Asia’, in Devleena Ghosh, Heather 
Goodall and Stephanie Hemelryk-Donald (eds), Water, Sovereignty and Borders in Asia and 
Oceania (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 96. 
4 Renner, ‘Water Challenges in Central-South Asia’, p. 8. 
5 Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, p. 50. 
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water cooperation and conflict is complex and does not manifest itself in the 
simplistic binary proposition of peace and war. 
Nonetheless, the fear of water wars in South Asia persists and is based 
largely on the following four factors: 
 There is intense competition over water resources in South Asia. 
 Water scarcity due to climate change and increasing demand from 
growing populations is expected to exacerbate this competition to a 
level of outright conflict. 
 The region is already politically and socially unstable.  Such volatility 
combined with increasing environmental stresses may create a 
situation particularly vulnerable to conflict. 
 India is perceived as a regional bully. 
It is this last point that is the focus of this article, which argues that a 
significant factor preventing war over water is the very presence of a hydro-
hegemon.  This is because India elicits consent from its co-riparians for the 
order it has established, and India’s superior power position effectively 
discourages any violent resistance against the order.6 
Australia is increasingly interested in the challenges of inter-state water 
governance in South Asia and the potential of significant conflict that may 
arise out of unresolved issues.  Australia is a major partner in the South Asia 
Water Initiative, led by the World Bank, which aims to increase regional 
cooperation on shared water issues.7  In October 2012, Australian Prime 
Minister Gillard visited India to launch the India-Australia Water Science and 
Technology Partnership to enhance cooperation on water management in 
the region.8  These are two of the most prominent initiatives that Australia is 
involved in, but there are many more examples of lower-level collaborations 
between academic institutions and businesses.   
Yet despite the growing interest of Australia in these issues, little research 
has been conducted into the multi-level dynamics of water conflict and water 
cooperation—together known as water interactions—in South Asia, nor into 
how India’s role as the regional hegemon affects these interactions and the 
prospect of outright conflict.  This article attempts to fill this knowledge gap.  
                                                 
6 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony—A Framework for Analysis of Trans-
boundary Water Conflicts', Water Policy, vol. 8 (2006), p. 437. 
7 South Asia Water Initiative, <http://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/node/8> [Accessed 30 
September 2013]. 
8 ‘India-Australia Water Science and Technology Partnership’, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 21 October 2012, <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/HotTopics/Pages/Display.aspx? 
QID=840> [Accessed 30 September 2013]. 
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This article begins by establishing the concept of hydro-hegemony and how 
it applies to water conflict and cooperation.  The second half of the article 
systematically addresses each of India’s bilateral relationships with its co-
riparians Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.  It illustrates that the 
power asymmetry in the region creates an equilibrium of conflict and 
cooperation that is highly unlikely to tip over into a ‘water war’.  The lengthy 
and fraught negotiation process between India and Pakistan over the Indus 
Waters Treaty was ultimately a confidence-building measure that resulted in 
an agreement that has withstood numerous other conflicts.  So too the 
agreements India has with Nepal and Bangladesh, though problematic, were 
entered into through consent not coercion.  As for Bhutan, this Himalayan 
kingdom has on the whole benefited tremendously from its cooperative 
relationship with the hydro-hegemon.  
This article takes the realist view that states are predominant actors in 
international relations and that they act as coherent units.9  Of course water 
interactions occur within a complex network of numerous types of actors on 
multiple levels, but it is not the purpose here to explore these.  Similarly, it is 
not in the scope of this article to assess the numerous inequalities and 
injustices that arise out of situations of great power asymmetry.  While 
hydro-hegemony may produce unfair outcomes, it also produces stability 
that mitigates the prospect of water war, and it is this point that is of primary 
concern here. 
Hegemony and Water Conflicts 
Power relations between riparians largely determine the control over water 
resources that each riparian wields.  Even the upstream/downstream 
dynamic is predicated on power; those upstream use water to get more 
power, and those downstream use power to get more water.10  
Unsurprisingly, it is the more powerful side in a water interaction—especially 
when the competition is over scarce water resources—that achieves and 
maintains the upper hand.11  This is not to say that the stronger party will 
always use brute strength in the attainment of self-serving objectives.  
Creating compliance through the use of soft power (i.e., having a self-serving 
ideology freely adhered to by the weaker actor) is a mechanism most 
frequently utilised by the stronger party.12  
Power asymmetry of a lesser or greater degree is usually present in water 
basins, and affects the water interactions that are established, thereby also 
                                                 
9 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, third edition (New York: 
Longman, 2001), p. 20. 
10 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', p. 436. 
11 Ibid., p. 442. 
12 Ibid., p. 443. 
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influencing the outcomes of and approaches to water conflicts.13  In contexts 
of a relative balance of power, riparians can decide together whether or not 
to collaborate on water projects or governance issues; but in an ‘anarchic’ 
basin, each state acts unilaterally and opts against communicating with its 
neighbours beyond the bare minimum.14  This is the case in South Asia 
currently, where, as is discussed below, a culture of secrecy prevails.  
Hydro-hegemony occurs when one state within a shared river basin asserts 
its power over other riparian states—even upstream ones.15  This is because 
hydro-hegemony rests not on riparian position alone, but on three pillars: 
 Pillar 1: Power, consisting of;  
o Political power 
o Economic power 
o Military power 
 Pillar 2: Riparian position 
 Pillar 3: Potential for water resource exploitation.16 
For every riparian in any given transboundary water scenario, the strength of 
each of these pillars is relative to the others, and to the pillars of all other 
riparians.  Needless to say, power asymmetry is highly dynamic because the 
only constant pillar is riparian position.  Furthermore, power is amorphous, 
relative, subjectively perceived, and therefore impossible to quantify.  
‘Hegemony’ connotes domination and coercion, but its real-world 
applications are nuanced.  It can bring stability to a region, provide 
patronage to weaker states and provide a platform for leadership on issues 
of mutual concern.  Indeed, hydro-hegemony is a significant factor 
preventing war over water because non-hegemonic states usually comply 
with the order preferred by the hegemon, whose superior power position 
effectively discourages any violent resistance against the order.17  
                                                 
13 Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, ‘Transboundary Water Interaction 1: Reconsidering 
Conflict and Cooperation', International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, vol. 8, no. 4 (2008), p. 309. 
14 Jeroen F. Warner and N. Zawahari, ‘Hegemony and Asymmetry: Multiple-chessboard Games 
on Transboundary River', International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, vol. 12, no. 3 (2012), p. 217. 
15 C. Sneddon, 2013, ‘Water, Governance and Hegemony', in, L. M. Harris, J. A. Goldin and C. 
Sneddon, Contemporary Water Governance in the Global South: Scarcity, Marketization and 
Participation (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 15-6. 
16 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', pp. 451-452.  These pillars of hydro-hegemony have 
been originally developed by T. Naff and R. Matson in 1984 in relation to the Middle East, and 
expanded on by A. Medzini in 2001 in relation to the River Jordan. 
17 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', p. 437. 
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Hegemony is “leadership buttressed by authority” and is thus distinguished 
from dominance, which is “leadership buttressed by coercion”.18  Certainly, in 
the case of transboundary water interactions in South Asia, India’s hydro-
hegemony has not been an oppressive or destructive force, though India is 
yet to mature into a true leader on the regional water front.  
Whether a hydro-hegemon chooses leadership or domination, and when 
they choose to do so, is ultimately governed by the broader political 
context.19  Likewise, a weaker party to the interaction may choose to comply 
with the hydro-hegemon’s direction for reasons other than its apparent or 
immediate best interest in the matter at hand.  Control over water resources, 
then, is not achieved through violence but rather consent, which is gained 
through a suite of often subtle mechanisms.20 
There are four mechanisms used to produce compliance.  The mechanism 
of coercion can utilise military force, covert action, or direct pressure.  
Military force is rarely used in water conflicts, and usually then only as a last 
resort.  Covert action could include undercover operations aimed at 
weakening the political, military or hydraulic apparatus of its competitor, or 
make a pact with those who will.  Direct pressure is arguably the most 
commonly used tactic in hydropolitics, and includes trade embargoes, 
diplomatic isolation, threat of military action, espionage and propaganda.21 
The utilitarian mechanism employs incentives as a ‘carrot’ to the ‘stick’ of 
coercive measures.  Incentives for compliance with a hydro-hegemon’s 
preferred state of affairs can include trade incentives, diplomatic 
recognitions, military protection, and the promise of cooperation on mutually 
beneficial water projects.  These tactics can create stability in the water 
interactions between the involved parties.22 
Normative mechanisms are those that result in a formalised agreement, 
such as a treaty.  A treaty is generally considered an instance of 
cooperation, however when viewed through the lens of hydro-hegemony this 
is not necessarily the case.  The signing of an agreement to institutionalise 
the status quo may be to the hydro-hegemon’s advantage, even if the 
weaker riparian will benefit enough to justify signing.23  If an agreement is 
bilateral, it precludes participation of non-signatory riparians, thereby pre-
empting their rights and ultimately leaving the issue unresolved.24  
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 438. 
19 Ibid., p. 455. 
20 Ibid., p. 436; Mark Zeitoun, Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner, ‘Transboundary Water 
Interaction II: The Influence of “Soft” Power’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, vol. 11, no. 2 (2011), p. 165. 
21 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', pp. 446-7. 
22 Ibid., p. 447. 
23 Ibid., pp. 447-8. 
24 Ibid. 
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The ideological mechanism can take many guises—soft power, 
securitisation, and the creation of a sanctioned discourse.  The use of soft 
power allows issues to be framed by one riparian in a way that their portrayal 
is accepted without question; somewhere between fully conscious 
bargaining within an established order and unacknowledged acceptance of 
that order, the weaker side’s implicit (or explicit) compliance with the 
outcome is assured.25  An important component of soft power is how the 
hegemon is perceived by those it aims to influence.26  
The mechanism/s employed by a hydro-hegemon depend on its capacity to 
persuade subordinate actors to accept not just the hegemon’s authority, but 
also to adopt and internalise its values and norms intended to impose one 
solution over others.  In other words, hydro-hegemons will avoid coercive 
tactics if the non-hegemons would comply unwittingly.27  This is the situation 
in South Asia currently, and we now explore how India as hydro-hegemon 
has been able to create consent. 
India as Hydro-hegemon 
India scores highly on the three pillars of hydro-hegemony.  It wields the 
most power in South Asia in terms of political, economic and military might.  
Because of this, it also has significant capacity for water resource 
exploitation such as the construction of dams for hydropower generation.  
India certainly has the largest political and geographic stake in the 
transboundary waters of South Asia.  But most rivers in eastern and north-
eastern India cut across a number of countries, complicating the number of 
stakeholders in dispute resolution and treaty negotiations.  
Neighbours view India with suspicion, making it difficult to conduct 
discussion on common-interest issues in good faith.28  India’s hegemony is 
assumed to be in some way nefarious, undermining regional stability, or 
necessarily contrary to the interests of India’s co-riparians.  But while India’s 
relations with its co-riparians (except Bhutan) are far from cordial,29 violent 
conflict is unlikely because ultimately India’s hydro-hegemony is predicated 
on consent, not coercion.  India is able to use its soft power as well as 
normative and utilitarian mechanisms of hydro-hegemony to overcome the 
fact that it is not the upper riparian on all the rivers that pass through its 
territory.  India has been able to gain access to upstream water resources 
                                                 
25 Zeitoun, Mirumachi and Warner, ‘Transboundary Water Interaction II‘, pp. 163-4. 
26 M. Bhasin 2008, ‘India's Role in South Asia—Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant 
Leadership?’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 3, no. 4 (October-December 2008), p. 3. 
27 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', p. 438. 
28 Binyak Ray, ‘Global Conventions and Regulations on International Rivers: Implications for 
South Asia’, in Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, and Robert J. Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and 
Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage, 2008), p. 84. 
29 Ibid., p. 88. 
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and influence downstream riparians to overlook transboundary water 
arrangements that may adversely affect them, all without the use of violence. 
The primary way in which India deals with its neighbours is bilateral, and 
tensions remain about whether transboundary water disputes should 
continue to be handled bilaterally (the hydro-hegemon’s prerogative) or 
internationalised.30  India’s persistence in establishing purely bilateral 
arrangements and not involving the international community in matters of 
transboundary water governance in South Asia certainly has been decisive 
in shaping the politics of water sharing in the region.31  Even though all the 
rivers flowing through India are international and pass more than one 
country, all the treaties on these rivers are bilateral.32  India did not even 
acknowledge that usage of the Ganges is an international issue until 1970.33  
Tellingly, India’s latest National Water Policy devotes only two paragraphs to 
transboundary waters, and these emphasise bilateralism as the sole 
approach.34  Of course this should not be surprising; hegemonic powers 
benefit through bilateral arrangements, while small and medium powers 
enjoy greater leverage within multilateral institutions.35  Yet the lack of 
multilateralism in South Asia regarding transboundary water management is 
not solely a manifestation of India’s self-centred ambitions.  The large 
number of riparian countries in the region complicates the processes of 
multilateral diplomacy and negotiation—of finding common ground for 
reaching agreement on collective action, norms or rules.36  In the interest of 
avoiding conflict, bilateralism is a faster and surer approach than 
multilateralism. 
International agreements, be they bilateral or multilateral, are rarely 
instances of pure cooperation; more often than not they belie conflict and 
asymmetry of outcome.  An example of a hegemon enshrining inequalities in 
international agreement is the Treaties of Friendship that India instigated in 
the region.  The treaties of friendship arose at a time when India gained 
independence from the British and wanted to prevent a communist influence 
spreading south from China.  Consequently, India concluded three lopsided 
treaties with its small neighbours; Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim to bring them 
                                                 
30 Douglas Hill, ‘The Regional Politics of Water Sharing: Contemporary Issues in South Asia’, in 
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt and Robert J. Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations 
and Communities in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage, 2008), p. 75. 
31 Ibid., p. 60. 
32 Richa Singh, Trans-boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia: Towards ‘Water for 
Peace' (New Delhi: Centre for Democracy and Social Action, 2008), p. 36. 
33 Hill, ‘Boundaries, Scale and Power in South Asia’, p. 91. 
34 Government of India, ‘National Water Policy (2012)’, Ministry of Water Resources, 
Government of India, 2012. 
35 National Research Council of the National Academies, Himalayan Glaciers, p. 91. 
36 Ray, ‘Global Conventions and Regulations on International Rivers’, p. 84. 
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into its sphere of influence in order to make the Himalayas a strong natural 
border with China.37  A similar treaty was signed with Bangladesh in 1972.38  
Unsurprisingly, India has since been reluctant to update any of these 
treaties.39  But while this is a source of some discontent (especially in 
Nepal),40 there has been no real momentum from these smaller states to 
agitate for change.  One tactic available to the non-hegemon is that of issue 
linkage wherein non-water-related issues are included in negotiations over 
water as a point of leverage.41  This, however, has not been a tactic utilised 
by India’s co-riparians to alter the status quo of the Treaties of Friendship. 
India’s insistence on secrecy regarding hydrological data is contributing to 
the sense of distrust within the region, and increases tensions about 
transboundary water management.  A striking feature of many 
transboundary hydropower projects in South Asia is that they were not 
known through government-to-government communication, but through 
public media.  Timely and adequate information is never easily or fully given.  
This has been Pakistan’s complaint over the Baglihar proposal, and 
Bangladesh’s complaint over the Tipaimukh and the National River Linking 
Project in India.42  India’s 2012 National Water Policy hints at declassifying 
more hydro data,43 but as the balance of power is already tipped in India’s 
favour, there is arguably little political imperative to do so.  Moreover, a 
culture of secrecy and suspicion prevails across all governments in South 
Asia, thus stifling any inclination to declassify or share data.44 
As we can see, on the whole India’s hydro-hegemony has been a factor in 
preventing violent conflict because it creates compliance among the co-
riparians rather than relying on coercion to maintain the status quo.45  The 
rest of this article will discuss how this occurs in each of the bilateral co-
riparian relationships India has. 
                                                 
37 Surya P. Subedi, Dynamics of Foreign Policy and Law: A Study in Indo-Nepal Relations (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 25, 42. 
38 Emma Condon, Patrick Hillman, Justin King, Katherine Lang and Alison Patz, ‘Resource 
Disputes in South Asia: Water Scarcity and the Potential for Interstate Conflict’, prepared for the 
Office of South Asia Analysis, US Central Intelligence Agency (Madison: Robert M. La Follette 
School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin, 1 June 2009), p. 9. 
39 Bhasin, ‘India's Role in South Asia’, p. 16. 
40 Subedi, Dynamics of Foreign Policy and Law, p. 5. 
41 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', pp. 454-5. 
42 Singh, Trans-boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia, p. 16. 
43 Government of India, ‘National Water Policy (2012)’. 
44 Navnita C. Behera, ‘Forging New Solidarities: Nonofficial Dialogues', in, M. Mekenkamp, P. 
van Tongeren and H. van de Veen (eds), Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An 
Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), p. 227. 
45 Zeitoun and Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony', p. 437. 
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India and Pakistan 
Pakistan is downstream of India on the Indus River system, and at the same 
time is increasingly water scarce.  Between 1947 and 2011, Pakistan's 
population swelled almost twelvefold.  Now Pakistan has more than 180 
million people, and is likely to have 335 million citizens by 2050.  While the 
population has ballooned, the quantity of water in the single river system on 
which the country is dependent has remained the same.  With per capita 
availability of freshwater declining at an alarming rate, Pakistan has gone 
from being a water-surplus country to a water-distressed one.46  Moreover, 
the issue of water quality is as important to Pakistan as water quantity.  An 
estimated 40-55 million Pakistanis do not have access to safe drinking 
water, yet the government spends forty-seven times as much on the military 
budget as on water and sanitation.47 
The confluence of water-related problems and military might in Pakistan is 
troubling for the region.  There are grave concerns about what might happen 
in this water-distressed, nuclear-armed, terrorist-besieged, overpopulated, 
heavily irrigation dependent and already politically unstable country if its 
single water lifeline, the Indus River, continues to be depleted at the current 
rate.48  This reduction in the Indus River flow could be due to unsustainable 
irrigation practices by Pakistan, climate change affecting Himalayan glacial 
melt patterns, or diversions upstream in India.  Indeed, there is a widespread 
perception in Pakistan that Indian control of the Indus water head can be 
misused to block water to Pakistan and devastate its economy.49  This 
perception is a manifestation of the soft power that India wields as hydro-
hegemon.  In such a context, disputes over water will likely continue to 
undermine the prospect of a stable and sustainable peace between India 
and Pakistan.50  
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the object of most water-related contention 
between India and Pakistan.  It is both a symbol of cooperation between the 
two countries (because it has withstood armed conflict) and discord 
(because it continues to foster resentment).  It thus illustrates that conflict 
and cooperation coexist,51 and is a case in point of how the absence of war 
is not equivalent to an efficient and equitable solution.52  Although it is often 
hailed as a great example of bilateral cooperation at a time of conflict 
between the riparian states, this argument ignores the historical 
contingencies that were so important in constraining Pakistan's initial scope 
of action.   
                                                 
46 Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, p. 218. 
47 Renner, ‘Water Challenges in Central-South Asia’, p. 6. 
48 Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, p. 227. 
49 Singh, Trans-boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia, p. 10. 
50 Condon et al., ‘Resource Disputes in South Asia’, p. xv. 
51 Zeitoun and Mirumachi, ‘Transboundary Water Interaction 1’, p. 299. 
52 Singh, Trans-boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia, p. 32. 
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The agreement between India and Pakistan was largely brokered with the 
assistance of the World Bank and, although there was the appearance of 
concession, India was able to exercise its power as a hydro-hegemon and 
achieve its objectives.53  Yet the eight-year process of negotiating the IWT 
was an important exercise in compromise and confidence building between 
the two conflicted states.  Both countries wanted the eastern basin of the 
Indus River system, which is better for agriculture, but Pakistan relinquished 
it and agreed instead to develop the western basin.  India kept control of the 
upstream areas but refrained for a decade from developing canals and 
agricultural infrastructure on the eastern basin to allow Pakistan time for its 
own agricultural development.54  
The IWT divides the six major rivers of the Indus River system between the 
two countries.  In 1960, India was allocated complete use of the three 
eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi), while Pakistan was allocated nearly 
unfettered use of the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab).  Both 
countries are allowed under certain, narrowly defined circumstances, to use 
each other’s rivers.  In practice, Pakistan has little to gain from this provision, 
as no major rivers originate within its political borders.  The Indian 
Government, however, can significantly limit the flow of water into 
Pakistan.55  Nonetheless, India argues that it is actually Pakistan that has the 
better end of the deal: India contributes more to the Indus than does 
Pakistan, yet Pakistan is allowed to take proportionally far more than India.56 
Another example of the fraught relationship between India and Pakistan 
regarding shared water resources is the imbroglio over the Baglihar Dam on 
the Chenab River in the eastern basin of the Indus River system.  Pakistan 
has opposed the Baglihar Dam on the grounds that it violates the IWT 
because of its potential use by India to store or divert waters destined for 
Pakistan.57  The IWT does not permit India to build retention or diversion 
projects on the Chenab, Indus or Jhelum rivers.58  Construction of the dam 
began in 1999 and, following Pakistani objections, the World Bank 
adjudicated in 2005 that the dam would only be filled between 21 June and 
31 August, with Pakistan’s prior consent and with specified minimum river 
flows.  Yet, in 2008, India continued to fill the dam well into September, 
considerably reducing the Chenab’s flow and causing crop damage in 
                                                 
53 Hill, ‘Boundaries, Scale and Power in South Asia’, p. 89. 
54 Shuntaro Yamamoto, 'The Indus Water Dispute and its Relation with Domestic Policies', in 
Nevelina I. Pachova, Mikiyasu Nakayama and Libor Jansky (eds), International Water Security: 
Domestic Threats and Opportunities (USA: United Nations University Press, 2008), pp. 30-1. 
55 Condon et al., ‘Resource Disputes in South Asia’, pp. 4-5. 
56 Fred Pearce, When the Rivers Run Dry: Water—The Defining Crisis of the Twenty-first 
Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), p. 177. 
57 Condon et al., ‘Resource Disputes in South Asia’, p. 6. 
58 Ibid., p. 38. 
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Pakistan.  A World Bank tribunal subsequently asked India to lower the 
height of the dam.59 
India claims the Baglihar project is a fully legal scheme as it involves no 
water storage and therefore does not violate the IWT.  India has accused 
Pakistan of trying to prevent it from addressing the grievances of the people 
of Jammu and Kashmir.60  This claim is not entirely unreasonable 
considering that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are in dire need of power 
and have not been taken into account by the IWT.  They believe Pakistan 
wants to deny them the right to use the state’s own rivers.61  Nonetheless, 
India’s insistence on the legality of the dam is putting strain on the 
institutions of the treaty by bending the rules of the agreement and violating 
its spirit of fairness and equality.62  While this may be unfair, it is significant 
that the grievances between the hydro-hegemon and its co-riparian are 
addressed through the established legal framework, to which Pakistan has 
consented, rather than through outright violence or war. 
India and Nepal 
It is said that water and energy pose the biggest constraint on India's growth 
because demand for both is increasing at a rate faster than current capacity 
can provide.63  Part of India's energy shortfall can be addressed through 
domestic hydropower generation potential,64 though there is strong civil 
society opposition to dam building in India.65  Nepal's enormous hydropower 
potential could provide a convenient and significant supply of 'clean' energy 
for India's growing needs.  By developing its major rivers, Nepal can provide 
large hydropower and storage projects to augment the low flows during the 
lean season and, to a large extent, mitigate India's power shortfall, 
particularly in the north of the country.66 
Nepal's theoretical hydropower potential is enormous, at 83,000 MW 
(identified power potential is 42,000 MW).67  Revenues from hydropower 
sales could multiply the growth rate in several Nepalese sectors, including 
                                                 
59 Renner, ‘Water Challenges in Central-South Asia’, p. 7. 
60 Singh, Trans-boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia, p. 23. 
61 Ibid., p. 23. 
62 Condon et al., ‘Resource Disputes in South Asia’, p. 38. 
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industry, agriculture and tourism.68  If properly planned and managed, 
development of Nepal's storage potential could yield tremendous benefits 
not just in terms of hydropower generation, but flood control during the 
monsoon, flow augmentation for downstream irrigation and navigation and 
water supply.69  Nepal’s lack of capacity for river diversion or water storage 
is at the root of disputes with India in relation to both hydropower generation 
and flood control.70  
Yet hydropower production remains largely undeveloped for domestic uses 
and export.  Nepal produces only 714 MW of electricity for its 30 million 
citizens from all sources of energy, with the result that power outages for 
several hours a day throughout the year are common.71  Only 15 per cent of 
the population has access to electricity and per capita electricity 
consumption is among the lowest in South Asia.72  Indeed, a country that 
could be a major exporter of electricity actually imports power from India.73 
Nepal and India (then under British rule) began cooperating over water 
resources in 1920.74  Since then, there have been a significant number of 
positive and mutually beneficial instances of cooperation regarding water 
resources.  To promote high-level coordination in implementing various 
agreements and understandings, a Nepal-India joint Committee on Water 
Resources, headed by each country's water resources secretary, has been 
set up as the umbrella mechanism covering all water related committees and 
groups.75  Indian-aided projects, besides establishing modest hydropower-
generating capacity, have helped bring 300,000 hectares of farmland in 
Nepal under irrigation.76  Nepal and India have also engaged in issues-
linkage by bundling together projects related to irrigation, hydropower, 
navigation, fishing and forestry.77  
Treaties, however, are not the embodiment of unequivocal cooperation.78  
There are usually power asymmetries at play that can lead to less than 
equitable outcomes for the weaker party.  The hydro-hegemon may structure 
a treaty to reflect existing inequalities and use utilitarian mechanisms or soft 
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power to attain the weaker riparian’s compliance.79  This can be said to be 
the case in the transboundary water management treaties and agreements 
between India and Nepal.  There are several such treaties regarding the 
development of shared hydropower and irrigation projects, but most, though 
considered reasonable from India's viewpoint, are seen as a sell out by 
many in Nepal.80  The Koshi and Gandak river treaties of the 1950s did not 
deliver the expected benefits to Nepal (even following amendments in the 
1960s) and have left a bad legacy that, to this day, weighs down bilateral 
cooperation.81  
Even the implementation of the more recent Mahakali Treaty (1996) has 
been impeded by different interpretations of its terms.82  Indeed, it has been 
argued that the saga of the Mahakali Treaty presents itself as a case in point 
of Nepali polity and its relationship with its big southern neighbour.83  It 
certainly provides an interesting illustration of how India has used its hydro-
hegemony to securitise water issues between the two countries, especially in 
the Tanakpur Barrage controversy.  India began construction on the barrage 
on its own side of the Mahakali River then used discursive power to create a 
narrative of ‘panic politics’ that put pressure on the Nepalese Government to 
allow construction on the Nepali side.84 
Considering how easy it is for India to securitise water—to make it seem a 
threat in need of emergency action—it is understandable that Nepal is 
troubled by the reversal of the usual upstream-downstream dynamic.  
Resentment lingers, for example, over Nepal’s obligation to inform India of 
its proposed non-consumptive developments (including the construction of 
small and medium hydropower plants).  Meanwhile, India does not have to 
inform Nepal of the same, even when it developed large-scale irrigation 
schemes in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.  Because of an ambiguity in a bilateral 
agreement India claims it has prior right to consumptive water use in 
watercourses shared by the two countries.85  
At the same time, there is enormous political pressure within Nepal to 
harness water resource vis-a-vis India, particularly through mega projects, 
which are believed to bring more economic benefit and political kudos than 
more moderately sized undertakings.86  Moreover, Nepali party functionaries 
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fear political allegations that any project is not moving forward due to their 
action or inaction, irrespective of technical, economic or developmental 
demerits of such projects.  They prefer to be seen supporting projects rather 
than questioning them.87 
Several commentators have suggested that India has not been sensitive to 
Nepal's concerns, nor has it handled wisely the difficult and complex 
transboundary water negotiations.88  As hydro-hegemon, however, India 
retains the prerogative to establish the agenda for water interactions, and 
has no obligation to extend courtesies to its co-riparians above and beyond 
that which is stipulated in international water law and any other relevant 
treaties to which India is signatory.  
India and Bhutan 
In stark contrast to India’s occasionally troubled relationship with Nepal is 
India’s apparently symbiotic one with Bhutan.  Bhutan's water abundance 
and topography contribute to the country's propitious energy situation, 
namely hydropower production.  Bhutan's dams have been developed with 
foreign aid, primarily from India, and it is India that is the largest customer of 
Bhutanese hydropower.89  India is connected to the Bhutanese hydropower 
through the 336 MW Chukha project, as well as the Kurichu, Chukha Stage 
II projects, and the 1,000 MW Tala Dam.90 
The collaborative and seemingly friendly nature of the relationship between 
Bhutan and India in regards to transboundary water resource management 
can be attributed more to Bhutan’s far-sightedness and political adeptness 
than to India’s attempts are creating more equitable regional relations.  India, 
of course, can use the utilitarian mechanism and elicit compliance from 
Bhutan (and, indeed, Nepal) because Bhutan is heavily dependent on India 
for trade and almost entirely reliant on India for navigation and transport 
routes.91  But Bhutan has been able to turn that to its own advantage. 
For Bhutan, the assistance gained from India in developing its hydropower 
capacity has been crucial in the socio-economic development of the country.  
Indeed, Bhutan has the distinction of achieving the highest per capita income 
in South Asia by exploiting its hydropower reserves through environmentally 
sound projects, mostly small in scale and based on run-of-the-river 
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technology, which it then exports to India.92  Export of hydropower brings in 
more than half of Bhutan's total revenue.93  India has not begrudged Bhutan 
these benefits, and perhaps its willingness to facilitate mutually beneficial 
outcomes with a cooperative partner could serve as a model for similar 
cooperation with Nepal in due course.  This illustrates that the presence of a 
hydro-hegemon need not lead to zero-sum games.  Bhutan has been able, 
despite its relative weakness, to manage transboundary water interactions in 
a way that creates positive sum outcomes. 
India and Bangladesh 
Of all the South Asian states, Bangladesh is in the weakest negotiating 
position with India.  It is also the most likely to suffer the most dire 
consequences of river diversions upstream and transboundary water 
resource mismanagement.  Bangladesh's external water dependency (the 
percentage of water that originates outside a country’s political borders) is 
91.33 per cent and thus one of the highest in the world.  Yet its per capita 
freshwater availability (7,569 cubic metres per year) is almost five times 
higher than India's.94  This, however, is as much a curse as it is a blessing.  
Bangladesh’s low elevation makes it prone to flooding during the monsoon 
season, and also prone to drought during the dry season between January 
and May.  Management of shared river resources is therefore particularly 
critical for Bangladesh.95 
Bangladesh is criss-crossed by 230 major rivers, with fifty-four of them 
(especially the largest ones) flowing in from India.  Watercourses cover 7 per 
cent of the country's total land area.  The Brahmaputra is the most important 
river of Bangladesh, but the Ganges and Meghna are also significant.96  The 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin sustains approximately 10 per cent of 
the world’s population, but is also one of the poorest regions in the world.97  
This poverty makes Bangladesh particularly vulnerable to the deleterious 
effects of upstream water engineering, such as large hydropower dams in 
the Himalayas and numerous diversions and water-storage dams in the 
middle and lower portions of the Ganges.  These upstream hydro-
engineering projects have caused massive side effects for Bangladesh, 
including dislocation of human communities, loss of resources such as 
fishery stocks, and increased hazards from flooding, to saltwater incursions 
and erosion of the Ganges delta.98  Bangladesh is always on the receiving 
end of these disasters, and so it is all the more important for it to reach 
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agreements that affect water flow upstream.  It is also a high priority for 
Bangladesh in developing a constructive domestic water policy and attaining 
development goals associated with this.99 
There is much criticism of the water-sharing arrangements between India 
and Bangladesh, which are seen as inequitable and symptomatic of the 
broader relationship between the two countries.  India has aggressively 
asserted its own interest to the detriment of Bangladesh.  The Indian 
perspective, in contrast, asserts that Bangladesh has been unwilling to 
compromise and has expected that its share of water resources will always 
remain undiminished.100  There is also a perception within Bangladesh that 
India secretly diverts a portion of the Ganges upstream during dry months, 
causing acute water stress and environmental damage to Bangladesh.  The 
Indian External Ministry counter-claims that it releases more water than is 
Bangladesh’s genuine requirement and that Bangladesh exaggerates its 
needs.101 
Bangladesh is also frustrated by exclusion from Indian and Nepalese 
negotiations over the Sapta-Koshi barrage despite the project having 
implications for Bangladesh.  Bangladesh has proposed all three countries 
should work together because the diversion of the Ganges will affect water 
flow to Bangladesh during the dry season.  Yet to date all discussions over 
the dam, which will likely produce 3,500 MW, have remained bilateral 
between India and Nepal.102  
An example of the hydro-hegemon instigating a treaty that institutionalises 
an inequitable status quo is India’s signing of the double bilateral Ganges 
River treaties with Nepal and Bangladesh.  The treaties helped maintain the 
status quo in favour of India and may be viewed as exclusionary devices 
within an inclusive process, which did confer some benefits onto the other, 
weaker riparians.103  India is likely to continue its pattern of resolving its 
water disputes with Bangladesh through bilateral negotiation rather than a 
regional approach.104  As hydro-hegemon, it is able to set the terms of 
cooperation and Bangladesh is likely to continue consenting to this stable 
arrangement. 
A point of major discord between India and Bangladesh is the Farraka 
barrage.  The barrage diverts water from the Bhagirati-Hoogli river system to 
flush out sediment from Calcutta, but Bangladesh argues that this harms the 
agro-ecological and economic wellbeing of southern Bangladesh.105  The 
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Farraka barrage embodies all that is wrong in the water relationship between 
Bangladesh and India.  It disregards Bangladesh’s ecology, water needs and 
the survival of its people.  It is therefore seen as unfair treatment meted out 
and the disregard shown to a smaller country by a ‘big brother’.106 
A second significant dispute between India and Bangladesh is over the 
proposed National River Linking Project, which Bangladesh claims will lead 
to flooding in Bangladesh and intensify the country’s dry season.107  
Conceived in 1982, the megaproject would transfer 178 billion cubic metres 
of water from India’s northern rivers including the Ganges and the 
Brahmaputra to the drier southern rivers through thirty diversion projects, 
including 3,000 storage reservoirs and 14,900 km of canals.  The plan had 
been dormant for two decades but was revived in 2002 when India ordered 
that the entire project be completed by 2016, a timetable that has no chance 
of being met.  
One reason that India gives for the urgency of the project is the need to 
increase the country’s irrigation capacity in order to meet the growing 
demand for grain, which, by 2050, would have to be sufficient to feed an 
estimated 1.5 billion people.108  India is also an irrigation intensive country,109 
and the National River Linking Project might provide enough water to 
increase irrigated farmland by more than 50 per cent and to power 34,000 
MW of hydropower capacity.110 
If this project comes to pass, it may increase hydropolitical tensions in South 
Asia.  Like Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal have voiced their opposition.111  
The National River Linking Project has also been met with widespread 
criticism by environmentalists and protests within India.112  It remains 
unclear, however, to what extent the regional fears about the projects are 
justified, and to what extent they are a manifestation of anti-Indian sentiment 
pervasive in South Asia. 
Conclusion 
India is the hydro-hegemon in various guises to Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Bangladesh.  It is often perceived as a bully, but when analysed closely, its 
actions are conducive to stability rather than conflict.  This is not to say they 
are always equitable for all stakeholders, but they are unlikely to incite a 
water war.  India does not dominate water interactions in the region, nor 
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does it achieve its hydro-hegemony through coercion.  It does have a strong 
and long-standing preference for bilateralism, which generally favours the 
hydro-hegemon.  Its insistence on maintaining strictly dyadic relations has 
not been challenged by sub-regional groupings or multilateral institutions in 
South Asia, though capacity arguably exists for the development of such 
bulwarks to India’s power.  Instead, India has used soft power, and 
normative and utilitarian mechanisms to elicit compliance from its co-
riparians while its superior power position effectively discourages any violent 
resistance against the status quo.113 
In short, India’s hydro-hegemony has created consent and stability in the 
transboundary water interactions in South Asia thus making water wars 
unlikely.  Tensions certainly exist about the management and development 
of shared rivers, but declared war or violent skirmishes are likely to 
undermine the complex system of mutually beneficial arrangements that 
currently exist.  Such a state of affairs can be said to epitomise the 
ambiguous nature of transboundary water interactions; conflict and 
cooperation always coexist, but an equilibrium is possible that precludes 
water war.  
Understanding these nuances of transboundary water interactions in South 
Asia will assist Australia in developing a conflict assessment that is neither 
unnecessarily alarmist nor simplistic.  Australia is strongly placed to bring 
this sophisticated view to the regional initiatives for transboundary water 
cooperation it has engaged in, namely the South Asia Water Initiative and 
the India-Australia Water Science and Technology Partnership.  There is an 
opportunity for Australia to provide a counterpoint to the proponents of the 
alarmist and counterproductive water wars thesis, and it should be taken.  
Australia must appreciate India’s powerful position in the transboundary 
water management in South Asia—and understand that while hydro-
hegemony may act as a safeguard against the prospect of water war, it does 
not necessarily create equitable outcomes for the weaker parties. 
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